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Summary –Many researchers try to explain consumer’s acceptance and opposition to genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) using social factors like “trust” in “direct causal” or “joint causal” (also referred to as
“associationist”) models. The latter approach considers attitudes to Genetically Modified foods (GM foods) to be
jointly determined by trust and risk perception. With data from a European Survey (Eurobarometer 64.3, 2005),
we use a recursive mixed process model to specify the importance of trust in the various organizations involved in the
public debate on the acceptance of genetically modified foods on behalf of the “ordinary citizens”. We discuss
the resulting portrait of European citizens that shows them to be increasingly optimistic about biotechnology, while
being divided on this question. We show that corroboration of direct causal or joint causal models depend on the
organizations concerned.
Keywords: biotechnology, consumer attitudes towards technology, Eurobarometer, genetically modified food, recursive
mixed-process model, trust
De l’impact de la confiance sur le consentement des consommateurs à acheter des aliments
génétiquement modifiés : étude empirique à partir d’une enquête européenne
Résumé – De nombreux chercheurs se sont intéressés à expliquer l’acceptation ou l’opposition des
consommateurs aux organismes génétiquement modifiés (OGM) à partir de différents facteurs sociaux
dans le cadre de modèles de « causalité directe » ou « jointe ». Ce dernier (également appelé « modèle
associationniste ») considère les attitudes envers la nourriture génétiquement modifiée comme
déterminées conjointement par la confiance et la perception du risque. A partir des données d’une enquête
européenne (l’Eurobaromètre 64.3 de 2005), nous développons un modèle récursif à réponse mixte pour
établir l’importance de la confiance dans les différentes organisations impliquées dans le débat public sur
l’acceptation des aliments génétiquement modifiés de la part des «citoyens ordinaires ». Nous discutons
par la suite ce portrait des citoyens européens qui les montre de plus en plus optimistes envers les
biotechnologies, bien que largement divisés sur la question. Nous montrons enfin que la pertinence
empirique des modèles de causalité directe ou jointe dépend du type d’organisations concernées.
Mots-clés : biotechnologie, attitudes des consommateurs envers les technologies, Eurobaromètre, aliment
génétiquement modifié, modèle récursif à réponse mixte, confiance
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1. Introduction
The use of biotechnology in production processes is widespread today in a number of
sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, agriculture, food-processing, chemistry, environment,
cosmetics, energy, etc. While the introduction of biotechnology in pharmaceuticals has
been largely accepted, agricultural biotechnologies have triggered off an intense debate
since their emergence, and especially with the introduction of the second generation of
value-enhanced or nutritionally enhanced genetically modified food (GM food).
Perceptions of innocuousness (or lack of the same) have led to a multiplicity of official
initiatives on the evaluation of this new technology in several industrialized countries
and an important mobilization of those civic associations that influence public opinion
(such as consumers’ associations, environmental and animal protection associations)
(Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2006). In contrast to the environmental protection
associations, which were the leaders in the emergence of the debate about genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) in Europe, consumers’ associations can be considered as
the followers, who became involved quite late in the debate. The initial positioning of
environmental protection associations such as Greenpeace France, one of the most
important actors in the structuring of the debate in France, earned them credibility in
the eyes of the public (Todt, 2003; Toke, 2004). Furthermore, while the opposition of
the environmental protection associations is founded on disagreement about principles,
consumers’ associations seem at first sight to be striving for the defense of consumers’
interests and in particular for the right of information.
Such mobilization of non-corporate private actors clearly fits into the framework
of a controversial or debated universe (Godard, 1998; Boisvert and Vivien, 2005;
Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2006): Where stances on public interest issues (environment
in this case) are constructed through an interplay among the various actors involving
scientific controversy, industrial interests, political stakes, lobby groups and media
effects. In such a debated scenario, it is crucial to answer the question about the
formation of individual and collective preferences. In this framework, several articles
show the diversity of consumers’ approval or refusal of biotechnology-based food-
products. The determinants of opposition to or acceptance of GMOs seem to be largely
linked to individual attitudes and values (Pardo et al., 2002; Bredahl, 2001), where the
level of scientific knowledge about biotechnology is of relatively less importance for the
formation of individual preferences (Barker and Burnham, 2001; Priest et al., 2003;
Sturgis et al., 2005; Gaskell et al., 2004). Finally, the notion of trust seems to be the
determining factor in a debated universe, which is characterized by uncertainty and a
lack of common knowledge (Boisvert and Vivien, 2005).
In the above context, the present work aims to characterize the position of
“ordinary citizens” who are not legitimized either by a specific expertise or by a
representative function (Joly and Marris, 2003). The originality of our work, which
also represents our contribution to the existing and growing literature, consists of a
quantitative test of the two alternative views of the relation between trust and
acceptance – “direct causal” or “joint causal” (also referred to as the “associationist”
model) – using econometric techniques; and to the best of our knowledge this has
never been done before.7
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The paper is based on a survey of public opinion in Europe on biotechnology. It
is organized as follows. The next section contains a literature review, followed by a
presentation of the survey data in section 3. Then the model is introduced in section 4,
followed by an explanation of the results of the empirical model in section 5. Section 6
discusses and concludes. In terms of the methodology, a recursive mixed process model
is retained to test the two alternative views of the relation between trust and
acceptance. This approach takes into account both simultaneity and endogeneity risks
that lead to biased coefficients. The estimation method is appropriate and consistent
for recursive systems in which all endogenous variables appear on the right-hand-sides
as observed (Roodman, 2009). The errors of each equation are correlated, sharing a
multidimensional distribution. The estimated parameters of trust in the acceptance
equation thus constitute an empirical test of the direct causal model, while the
correlations of the errors are an empirical test of the joint causal model.
The contribution of our paper can be summarized in terms of its two main results.
First, we find support for the direct causal model that insists that trust in scientists,
public authorities and industry influences acceptance. In terms of policy formulation,
this indicates that an effort to increase trust in these actors would lead to an increase in
the acceptability of GM foods. Second, concerning environmental and consumer
associations, our econometric model supports both models of causality (direct and
joint). It shows that in addition to trust in associations, the attitude of citizens vis-à-
vis biotechnology in general influences the level of trust and thereby the acceptability
of GM. In policy terms, there are conflicting agendas between various actors (public
authorities and associations) in both educating and building awareness in citizens of
the potential of biotechnology at large.
2. On the social determining factors of the willingness
to purchase GM food: The importance of trust
The attitude of the public towards GMOs has been studied in surveys taking into
account socio-demographic variables, the level of knowledge, trust in the information
and/or the actions of certain actors, social and political values, perception of the risks
and benefits linked to agricultural biotechnology, etc. In this context, there are two
types of works: First, there are surveys in experimental economics (Cook et al ., 2002;
Frewer et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2003; Huffman et al., 2004a, 2004b; Lusk et al., 2004;
Noussair et al., 2004; Townsend and Campbell, 2004; Townsend et al., 2004); and
second, there are analyses based on national and international surveys (Bredahl, 2001;
Pardo et al ., 2002; Priest et al., 2003; Gaskell e t al., 2004; Poortinga and Pidgeon,
2004, 2005, 2006; Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2006, 2007; Allum, 2007; Barnet et al.,
2007; Qin and Brown, 2008; Canavari and Nayga, 2009). Both types of studies show
the diversity of consumers’ acceptance or rejection of biotechnological food-products.
These different methodologies are coupled with a diversity of theoretical models
(human capital, conventionalist economics, behavioural economics, and social
psychology). Different models of econometric methods are also used for measuring the
relationship between social values and acceptability (zero-order and partial correlations,
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or simultaneous equations modelling). While the results are influenced by the impact
of knowledge and risk perception, trust is unanimously considered to be a key factor.
Some surveys carried out in Europe (Bredahl, 2001; Pardo et al ., 2002; Gaskell
et al., 2004) and in the United States (US) (Onyango et al ., 2004) on the importance
of the perceived risks and benefits indicatethat consumers are very sceptical about
the use of GMOs in food products. They consider that the new technology involves a
high element of risk. These consumers link the risk with the intended benefits of
GMOs and they are aware that zero risk concerning the impact of GMOs does not
exist. Attitudes towards GMO use in food products are explained by the risks as well
as the benefits associated with the technology. As Gaskell et al . (2004, p. 191) point
out, there is no direct relation between risk perception and opposition, but rather a
plurality of possible attitudes, differing in respect of the key social and cognitive
resources that may influence consumers’ views of GM food. In general, the level of
scientific knowledge in biotechnology is of relatively less importance for the
formation of individual preferences (Priest et al ., 2003; Gaskell et al ., 2004; Sturgis
et al., 2005; Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2006, 2007; Bukenya and Wright, 2007). On
this last point, according to Marris (2001) and Gaskell et al . (2004), the general
argument (which states that a higher level of knowledge would result in a better
acceptance of biotechnology) would reveal a misunderstanding about the way in
which consumers take decisions, as they take into account other factors. Moreover,
there is a huge disagreement on the link between knowledge and scientific attitudes
(Gaskell et al., 2004). This suggests, as noted by Barker and Burnham (2001), that
consumer behaviour is determined less by how much they know and more by what
they believe.
Trust has therefore been increasingly identified as the key issue that decision
makers involved in the management of risks have to address. Indeed different authors
put forward the notion of trust (Cook et al ., 2002; Todt, 2003; Priest et al., 2003;
Huffman et al ., 2004a, 2004b; Lusk et al., 2004; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004, 2005,
2006; Allum, 2007; Barnett et al., 2007; Qin and Brown, 2008; Canavari and Nayga,
2009) as a determining factor in defining the position of individuals concerning GMOs
applied to agriculture, in a different manner. According to Todt (2003) and Priestet al.
(2003), the controversy over the use of certain technologies is first a sign of the trust
gap between the actors. The usual arguments of scholars and political parties are that
if citizens trusted scientists and public authorities, they would have little reason to
oppose technological developments such as GM food (Gaskell et al ., 2004). In general,
many studies show that trust in scientists (Chaklatti, 2006; Allum, 2007; Canavari and
Nayga, 2009), government authorities (Barnett et al. 2007; Chaklatti 2006; Qin and
Brown 2008) or industry (Huffman et al., 2004a) has a positive impact on the
willingness to purchase GM food. On the contrary, trust in environmental associations
(Huffman et al., 2004a; Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2007) results in a lower
acceptability of GM food. This ties in with the “trust gap” result of Priest et al. (2003),
which explains the difference in the consumption of biotechnological products in
Europe and the US by the higher trust in Europe in consumers’ and environmental
protection associations, and the parallel higher trust in the US in industrial and
agbiotech firms rather than education and knowledge.9
D. Rousselière, S. Rousselière - Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies, 91 (1), 5-26
Accepting that there is empirical evidence that trust and GM food acceptability
are closely correlated, there are two alternative competing views (Eiser et al., 2002;
Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2005): the associationist and the causal views. The causal
model of trust is the most common interpretation of the generally strong relationships
between trust and GM food acceptability. Huffman et al. (2004a) developed such a
model inspired by Becker (1996). The latter suggests a formal model of individual
preferences or tastes, which takes into account the “social capital” (acquired through
relatives and participation in social networks) and the “personal capital” (acquired by
the individual through education and experience) (Becker, 1996, pp. 7-18). Trust, seen
as a function of these two types of capital, has then an influence on the choice between
different types of goods (for instance GM and regular food). The same individual holds
at the same time different levels of trust in different actors and it is this, which
influences the final decision. If an individual increases his trust in the information
coming from environmental protection groups or loses trust in the information coming
from agbiotech business, this contributes to lower his marginal utility of GM products
(by hypothesis). The marginal rate of substitution of the consumer between GM and
regular food decreases. At given relative prices, the consumer will purchase more
regular food products and lower his consumption of GM food products. Therefore
researchers use standard linear or logistic regressions with trust as an independent
variable to predict the level of the willingness to purchase or accept GM food in
general or some special GM varieties ( e.g. Onyango et al., 2004; Canavari and Nayga,
2009). According to this schema, two causal relationships can be identified. Trust
determines risk perception (H1(a)), which determines acceptability (H1(b)) (figure 1).
According to the associationist view, trust, acceptability and risk perception could
well be indicators or expressions of a more general attitude toward a technology (H2(a)
and H2(b)) than social psychology theories (Eiser et al., 2002; Poortinga and Pidgeon,
2005; Boecker, 2008) or conventional economics (Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2006)
would lead us to presume. There is a link between trust, risk perception and
acceptability, but trust and perceived risk are both independent indicators of attitude.
Risk judgements appear to reflect broader public stances on highly politicised issues.
The way in which people interpret evidence on such issues and form judgments about
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the acceptability of risk is likely to be influenced by these broader views. For Boecker
(2008), empirical evidence supporting the “associationist view” would question efforts
to increase the acceptability of GM foods through increasing trust in public bodies and
industries. As we do not have to assess causality but association 1 , this model is tested
with partial and zero-order correlation: “ controlling for acceptance should reduce or eliminate
any relationship between trust and perceived risk ” (Eiser et al., 2002, p. 2426).
Drawing on the results of this literature review, this paper will consider trust in
the actors involved in the public debate on GMOs as a determining factor in their
acceptability. Thus we will ensure that the methodology employed allows us to test the
two models of trust simultaneously, while controlling for trust in the various
organizations involved in the public debate.
3. Presentation of the survey data
The data used are taken from the special European survey “Eurobarometer 64.3”
dealing with “Foreign Languages, Biotechnology, Organized Crime, and Health Items”
(Gaskell et al., 2006). The special Eurobarometer reports are based on advanced
thematic studies carried out for the European Commission or other European
institutions, and integrated into the waves of the survey of the standard
Eurobarometer. Carried out in November and December 2005, Eurobarometer 64.3
covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union Member
States, resident in each of the Member States and aged 15 years and over.
25000 individuals from 25 countries were thus questioned. Our study is based on the
sample of the 12 320 individuals who had to answer the biotechnology module.
In our analysis, we have paid attention to the variables usually employed in the
literature. These include socio-demographic indicators (age, age at the end of formal
education, gender, professional status, place of residence, etc.), individual values
(political and religious stance, interest in science and politics) and variables concerning
the debate on biotechnology (trust, knowledge, information). For “trust”, the question
posed is: “ Do you trust the information on modern biotechnology coming from the following
sources? ”. Each time we thus obtain a qualitative dichotomous variable with the
modalities “trust” (mentioned) and “no trust” (not mentioned). The list of variables
obtained is relative to the level of confidence in some of the organizations 2 . The
possibility of answering “ do not know ” is thus offered as well as the possibility of
spontaneously answering “ none of these ”. A scale based on these various trusts has a weak
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.401), which allows us to suppose that very different social
dynamics are at stake (trust cannot be considered as an one-dimensional latent
variable). According to Gaskell et al. (2006), the 2005 survey data do not support the
1 There is a difference on this point between the seminal work of Eiser et al. (2002) (association)
and the interpretation of Poortinga and Pidgeon (2005) (causality).
2 “Consumer organizations”, “environmental organizations”, “animal welfare organizations”, “the
medical profession”, “farmer organizations”, “religious organizations”, “national government
bodies”, “international institutions (not companies)”, “industry”, “universities”, “political parties”,
“television and newspapers”.11
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claim that there is a crisis of trust in the actors involved in biotechnology in Europe:
Trust in every source of information shows substantial improvements since the first
Eurobarometer on biotechnology in 1999.
We also created new variables concerning the willingness to purchase GM food
and knowledge of biotechnology (figure 2). Five questions were asked about the reason
for purchasing GM food (with three possible modes of response: “ yes ”, “ no”, “ do not
know ”) 3 . Based on the positive responses to these five questions we thus constructed a
scale of acceptance going from 0 (“total opposition”) to 5 (“total acceptance”).
Cronbach’s Alpha for this scale is 0.917. The high reliability allows us to assume that
this scale is a good measure of the latent variable “acceptance of GM food”. According
to Gaskell et al . (2004), the division based on a “total opposition”/“at least one reason
to buy GM Food” dichotomy is one that discriminates most between the two groups
thus created. In effect, across all the countries, the mean for the purchase scale amongst
the potential buyers is 3.6. This relatively high value indicates that the public is split
on this issue: “ The non-buyers operate a total veto, but once a threshold of minimal acceptability
is reached, then people are inclined to find a number of reasons acceptable for buying GM foods ”
3 “I would buy GM food if it were healthier”, “I would buy GM food if it contained less pesticide
residues than other food”, “I would buy GM food if it were grown in a more environmentally
friendly way than other foods”, “I would buy GM food if it were approved by the relevant
authorities”, “I would buy GM food if it were cheaper than other foods”.
Figure 2. I would buy genetically modified food if…
Notes : Cronbach’s alpha = 0.917 (high reliability)
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(Gaskell et al., 2006, p. 24). But as Gaskell et al. (2006) point out in their latest survey
on Europeans attitudes toward biotechnology, in order to take account of the growing
heterogeneity of the European Union, the analysis should be based on the scale of
acceptance. We thus established a scale of acceptance (ACCEPTANCE) of the food use
of GMOs.
The health and environmental related reasons for buying GM food seem to be the
elements influencing the pro-GMO choice: 57%, 53% and 51% of Europeans would
buy GM food if it respectively were healthier, contained less pesticide residues and
were more environmental friendly. While environmental benefits attract more
potential purchasers than non-purchasers, European opinion is clearly split on this.
Neither approval by the relevant authorities nor lower prices appear to be persuasive
reasons in people’s choice intentions: “ While economics tells us that price is a key determinant
of people’s actual choices, in this hypothetical situation some may be responding as citizens rather
than as consumers” (Gaskell et al., 2006, p. 13).
A variable was created concerning knowledge of biotechnology. Questions
concerning the use of biotechnology had the goal of measuring the real knowledge of
individuals. A scale taking up the 10 questions can thus be constituted 4 . We thus
obtain a reliable scale (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.711) providing the number of right
answers (figure 3). Only 2% of the European population respond correctly to all
questions and 45.5% to more than five questions. But since 1996, there has been a
constant increase in the proportion of Europeans’ knowledge of genetics and
biotechnology. Gaskell et al. (2006) propose two different explanations: a generation
effect (young people may have been taught these topics at school) or a period effect (the
population as a whole is learning more about these emerging areas).
We also find small but significant correlations between willingness to purchase
GM food and various sources of information, suggesting that these items relate to each
other 5 : People with a willingness to purchase GM food are more likely to trust the
medical profession (r = 0.10; p < 0.01), national and international governments and
institutions (r = 0.08 and 0.07 respectively; p < 0.01), the European Union (r = 0.11;
p < 0.01), industry (r = 0.04; p < 0.01) and universities (r = 0,05; p < 0,01); they have
less trust in consumer, environmental and animal welfare associations (r = – 0.03,
– 0.05 and – 0.04 respectively; p < 0.01); knowledge in biotechnology and willingness
to purchase GM food are also positively correlated (r= 0.05; p < 0.01).
4 “It is possible to find out in the first few months of pregnancy whether a child will have Down’s
Syndrome”, “It is not possible to transfer animal genes into plants”, “Human cells and human
genes function differently from those in animals and plants”, “Ordinary tomatoes do not contain
genes, while genetically modified tomatoes do”, “Genetically modified animals are always bigger
than ordinary ones”, “Embryonic stem cells have the potential to develop into normal humans”,
“By eating a genetically modified fruit, a person’s genes could also become modified”, “More than
half of human genes are identical to those of a chimpanzee”, “Yeast for brewing beer or making
wine consists of living organisms”, “The cloning of living things produces genetically identical
copies”.
5 When measuring associations between dichotomic variables, one must pay attention to the fact
that Pearson correlations are by nature limited to a range largely smaller than – 1 to 1.13
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4. The econometric strategy: A recursive mixed process model
The relationship between consumer characteristics and consumer willingness to
purchase GM food is examined through an institutionalist econometric model of
consumption that is compatible with the various theories reviewed previously. As
Hendry (2000) suggests, our econometric model must take into account the fact that
the data used cannot be treated as if they were generated under controlled conditions,
and that we have to consider the existence of structural breaks and the intrinsically
dynamic nature of social reality (Pratten, 2005). Fixed effects and endogeneity are
therefore two issues that our econometric model must deal with. Finally, as in the
majority of cases, it is not possible to preview exactly how each individual will behave;
it is more reliable to estimate a probability, through a logistic model, that an
individual with some attributes will choose a given alternative.
To study the relationship between trust and acceptability, we concentrated on five
categories that are the most important in this debate on GMOs (figure 4): Trust in the
information on biotechnology furnished by environmental associations, by consumer
associations, by the agbiotech industry, by the scientists, and finally by public authorities
(international and national governments). As shown by a hierarchical cluster analysis 6 ,
Figure 3. Knowledge about biotechnology
Note : Cronbach’s alpha = 0.711 (good reliability)
6 The hierarchical cluster analysis, using Ward’s method, is not reported here. The results are strictly
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scientific and medical professions have a tendency to converge. Grouped together under
the label of “scientists”, this category is the must trusted by the Europeans (55%).
International and national governments on the one hand and industrial and farmers’
organizations on the other hand (“industry”) follow the same tendency, while being
clearly distrusted (only 24% and 12% respectively of European citizens trust them to
tell the truth about modern biotechnology).
To analyze these data further, different methods of limited dependent variable
regression could be used. However, there is a risk – namely that we might get biased
coefficients – as in the present case we could fear the simultaneity of decisions (trust
and acceptability); the responses to the different questions are not independent to one
another. Unfortunately, this issue was not correctly taken into account by previous
research ( e.g. Huffman et al ., 2004a; Onyango et al ., 2004; Townsend and Campbell,
2004; Canavari and Nayga, 2009), which was only based on the causal model of trust.
For example, Onyango et al . (2004) estimated the impact of trust in scientists,
industrialists or the medical profession with a dummy independent variable and
claimed that there was no effect. By contrast, it is reasonable to suppose that the
determining factors, both observable and unobservable, of a trust type and willingness
to purchase are variables that could potentially explain the other types of trust.
A simultaneous discrete choice model, or multivariate discrete choice model (Greene,
2009), may be a better indicator of the real consumer behaviour. To take into account
this simultaneity, which induces endogeneity risks that lead to biased coefficients
(Wooldridge, 2002), we estimate a conditional recursive mixed-process model
(Roodman, 2009). Whereas multivariate probit model allows only dummies to be used
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as dependent variables (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003, 2006), a mixed-process model
has a variety of link functions for limited dependent variables. This model gives us two
indications: The coefficient rho of correlation between residuals to assess the force of
association of the different variables (once controlled by a set of other variables); and
the trust coefficients in the acceptance equation as an estimation of the impact of a
given trust on willingness to purchase GM food. The former is a test of the
associationist model and the latter a test of the causal model. Therefore this
econometric strategy clearly fits not only with methodological issues but also with our
theoretical framework presented in the first part of this article. While a multivariate
response model based on a system of seemingly unrelated equations can only test an
associationist model of trust 7, with a recursive mixed process model, we are indeed in
a position to test simultaneously associationist and causal models of trust.
We do not use structural equations modelling. As the controversy between
economists and statisticians shows (Heckman, 2008), this modelling is possible only if
there is a consensus on a theoretical model (the first step of the scientific inquiry
described by Heckman). But if we face dissensus, as Karl Popper wrote in the Open
Society, “we should not attempt to cross our bridges before we come to them” (1995, p. 23). We
need an econometric strategy with as few constraints as possible in order to test the
concurrent models. If we agree with Pearl (2009), a structural approach to estimating
causality typically features stronger and untested assumptions. Then it is only when a
theory has been corroborated that a structural econometric approach is valid and more
powerful (especially for forecasting).
We thus select the six variables y1 (acceptance scale – labelled ACCEPTANCE),
y2 (trust in the information on biotechnology given by environmental associations
– labelled TRUSTENVI), y3 (trust in the information given by consumers’ associations–
labelled TRUSTCONSO), y4 (trust in the information on biotechnology given by the
agbiotech business – labelled TRUSTINDUS), y5 (trust in the information on
biotechnology given by scientists – labelled TRUSTSCIENCE) and y6 (trust in the
information on biotechnology given by public authorities – labelled TRUSTPUBLIC).
The system of equations to be estimated is then given by:
7 Equations in a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) system seem unrelated in the sense that
non-endogeneous variables appear on the right side of other equations, but their errors can be
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with six latent variables
X a vector of socio-demographic variables, V a vector of variables of social values and
attitudes and C a vector of country dummies variables. These vectors are identical in
each equation.
are six error terms distributed according to a multivariate
normal distribution, with rhoij the correlation between εi and εj8.
We choose the X, V and C vectors according to previous studies: the different
socio-demographic variables (age, gender, education, current socio-professional status,
marital status, location of residence), variables of values (political stance, religion,
variables in relation to the GMO debate), as well as dichotomous variables of countries
as a control on country effect.
This system includes an ordered probit (acceptance scale) and five binary probits
(trusts). It is estimated according to the method of simulation of maximum likelihood
(as the estimation implies the calculation of a sextuple integral within the likelihood
function). The Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive simulator
(Hajivassiliou, 2000; Greene, 2008) exploits the fact that a multivariate normal
distribution function can be expressed as the product of sequentially conditioned
univariate normal distribution functions. Instead of an evaluation of multivariate
integrals, the GHK simulator only requires draws from truncated normal distributions
and the evaluation of univariate integrals.
It corresponds to the cmp procedure of Stata developed and implemented by
Roodman (2009), based on previous work of Cappellari and Jenkins (2003, 2006) and
Gates (2006) 9. The use of the GHK simulator implies that results depend on a
number of random draws used to calculate the simulated likelihood function. However,
when the number of observations is high, convergence can be achieved, with some loss
in precision, with remarkably few draws per observation, as few as five when the
sample is 10 000 (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003; Roodman, 2009). Furthermore, draws
variables based on Halton sequences are shown to perform better than those based on
a pseudo-random draw (Cappellari and Jenkins 2006). Consequently the choice of
10 draws from Halton sequences allows us to be relatively conﬁdent in the estimated
parameters.
8 The usual assumption that ε is independently and identically distributed is clearly violated here,
as the observations are clustered in countries. However with a small number of clusters (lower
than 50) and very unbalanced cluster sizes, the cluster-robust standard error can be more biased
than the usual standard error.
9 See Hammond (2010) for a three simultaneous equations model included a censured regression
with two selection equations.
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5. Results
The results of the mixed recursive model are presented in table 1. The loglikehood
ratio (LR) test of rhoij (positive) allows us to justify the estimation of this mixed
process model and not of six independent equations: The null hypothesis (H0) of
independence () can be rejected (p-value < 0.0001).
Moreover, the coefficients rhoij (the correlation between the terms of errors in each
one of the equations) are significant and of interest: The unobserved variables
influencing the willingness to purchase GM food are positively correlated with the
unobserved variables influencing the trust in environmental and consumers’
associations. Trust and acceptability may be caused by a third variable or a more
general attitude toward biotechnology. This supports the associationist view of the
relation between trust in associations and acceptance. On the other hand, this theory
is invalid for the cases where rhoij is not significant: The unobserved variables
influencing acceptability appear not to be correlated to the unobserved variables
influencing the trust in scientists, public institutions and industry. All types of trust
are positively correlated with each other. The model with countries fixed effects has
a Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Aikake information criterion (AIC)
largely lower than the model without fixed effects, suggesting the former is
preferable 10. The trust parameters estimated are in all cases significant, which is a
validation of the causal view of trust.
From the above explanation of these results, we can conclude that it is not
exactly the same variables that significantly influence the different dependant
variables. Concerning the socio-demographic variables, the willingness to purchase
is positively influenced by age: This relationship can be modelled in the form of a
quadratic equation. The acceptability decreases strongly in relation to age but in a
successively slower manner. The marginal propensity to trust the information
provided by environmental and consumer associations increases among women and
consequently the marginal propensity to trust public authorities and to accept GM
food is lower. The level of knowledge influences positively all the dependent
variables (with the exception of the trust in the information provided by the
industry). The variables concerning the political scale influence the different
dependant variables. Indeed, in relation to the people subscribing to the ideology
of the left, those more to the right or not situated on the political scale at all, tend
to be less confident in the information provided by environmental associations. The
estimation emphasizes the “left” opposition to GMOs, which is commonly found
(see Chaklatti and Rousselière, 2006, 2007). However, another type of opposition
to GMOs can be identified. The people who oppose GMOs while they do not trust
any of the diverse organizations are people who are indifferent to scientific
arguments. In other words, there is a type of opposition not keen on scientific
information.
10 For the model with countries fixed effects, AIC=103 195.6 and BIC=105 510.3; for the model
without countries fixed effects AIC=105 922.3 and BIC=107 079.7.
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In order to estimate the impact of trust on acceptance, we can compute the
marginal effects at the mean (MEM) for the various level of the dependant variable
(table 2). According to Greene (2008), MEM is asymptotically identical to average
marginal effect (AME). In our case, AME the for binary variable can be interpreted as
an average treatment effect (ATE) or an average causal effect (ACE), the average effect
of trust on the whole population (Wooldridge, 2002).
We deduce that trusting environmental associations leads to a lowering of 4.7%
in the probability of having five reasons for purchasing GM food and a rise of 5% in
the probability of having no reason. Our conclusions confirm those of Huffman (2003)
on the important impact of trust in environmental associations. The impact of trust in
consumer associations is very similar (– 5.4% in the probability of having five reasons
and + 5.9% in the probability of having no reason). On the other hand, trusting the
scientists, the public institutions or the industrialists leads to a rise of the probability
of having five reasons for purchasing GM food (by 11.2%, 11.3% and 4.0%
respectively) and a lowering of the probability of having no reason (by 12.0%, 11.1%
and 4.0% respectively).
6. Discussion and conclusion
This study is based on results from a European survey that finds an increasing
optimism in the growth and acceptance of GM food. The main aim of the article was
to evaluate two different perspectives on the relation between trust and acceptability.
Similarly to Eiser et al. (2002), we find support for a complex view of trust that can
reconcile two apparently contradictory viewpoints.
Understanding the basis of public trust is essential for explaining the variation in
the public perception of technological risk. Trust in the information given by certain
actors (such as associations, scientists, industrialists and governments) is therefore a
determining factor in explaining the differences in attitudes concerning GM food
Table 2. Marginal effects of trust variables on acceptance
Level of
acceptance TRUSTCONS TRUSTENVI TRUSTSCIENCE TRUSTPUBLIC TRUSTINDUS
Y1=00 .059 0.050 – 0.120 – 0.111 – 0.040
Y1=1 0.004 0.003 – 0.007 – 0.009– 0.003
Y1=20 .001 0.001– 0.002 – 0.005– 0.001
Y1=3 – 0.001– 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000
Y1=4 – 0.008– 0.006 0.015 0.011 0.005
Y1=5 – 0.054 – 0.0470 .1120 .1130 .040
Note:Marginaleffects evaluatedatthe meanforeachlevel of acceptanceand foradiscretechange of trust
∂
∂
Probabilityof a level of acceptance
TRUST21
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consumption. The causal view is validated in every case (table 3) but leaves
unexplained the correlation between the error terms in the acceptance equation and in
some of the trust equations. Our econometric model is also supportive of an
associationist view that considers trust in associations to be a consequence of
acceptability (but not for the other types of trust). If we agree with the radical
falsificationism of the “first Popper”, any theories that are not full corroborated are
false. Consequently both theories are to be rejected. But according to the sophisticated
falsificationism of the “second Popper”, well described by Lakatos (1978), the objective
of the science is to arrive at an evolutionary process whereby theories become less bad.
Consequently, both theories may not be entirely rejected but integrated in a more
general approach. The mixed process model is justified if we consider a complex view
of trust, i.e. a causality oriented system (figure 5). Trust and acceptability may be
caused by a more general attitude toward biotechnology (maybe with feedbacks)
(H2 and H3) in a system with a causality oriented from trust to acceptability (H1).
This general model includes causal and associationist models as special cases.
This leads to important theoretical propositions in terms of economic analysis. It
is necessary to take into account values and perceptions in the economic theory of the
consumer, both as proposed by the human capital or the conventionalist approaches.
Our empirical analysis can then be understood as a corroboration of such theoretical
analysis. Trust has rightly assumed enormous prominence as an explanatory concept in
relation to dissent and conflict over the development trajectory of a wide range of
Table 3. The validation of the theories
View of the relation between trust and acceptance
CausalAssociationist
TRUSTCONS Yes (in part)Yes
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technologies. Consideration of the importance of a belief in public efficacy would
potentially seem to be a valuable complement to this view, and in particular to the
recent work on critical trust (Barnett et al., 2007). In terms of policy formulation, our
analysis indicates that an effort to increase trust in scientists, public authorities and
industry would lead to an increase in the acceptability of GM foods. There is a conflict
between these actors and the associations in educating and building awareness in
citizens on the potential of biotechnology at large.
Our work confirms the results of different studies, those using the same type of
data (transnational surveys including the latest Eurobarometer) and those using other
methodologies, on the importance of individual values and attitudes and of the
participation in certain social networks, or “the importance of general value
orientations or worldviews” (Pardo et al ., 2002, p. 9). However, compared with the
European situation in 2002, there are some minor changes in the “associations trust
effects”. The strong negative impact of trust in environmental associations on
willingness to purchase GM food decreases while at the same time the negative impact
of trust in consumer associations increases.
Further research will need to take into account the problems caused by the
European Union heterogeneity. According to Gaskell et al. (2006), the new EU10
countries are somewhat different to the EU15 countries in 2005: Science has not
achieved much penetration in public awareness in the new Accession States; the people
in these countries are relatively more optimistic about the contribution of technology
to society, and are just as supportive of medical, industrial and agricultural
biotechnologies; and finally they also have greater trust in actors and institutions
involved in science and technology. The next step in this research study is to take into
account both endogeneity and the institutional effect. Because of the increasing
heterogeneity of the European Union, the impact of trust may vary according to
institutional variables (rejection of hypotheses of identical coefficients). Additionally,
fixed effects models must be replaced by random effects models estimated according to
multilevel multi-process modelling (combining multilevel analysis and simultaneous
equations modelling) (Goldstein, 2003; Steele et al., 2007). To further strengthen the
results of this study and to confirm the same, it would be necessary to have subjective
scales of trust in one actor of the debate (which would then provide a scale of “trust
gap” at the individual level).
Based on the Eurobarometer, which is a face-to-face survey, our work may
undermine some economic factors and underestimate some social factors of the
acceptability of GM food. We may suspect that the hostility of the “citizen” becomes
attenuated when he is placed in the role of a “consumer” (Noussair et al., 2002). It is
quite possible that their valuations of the GM products would change if prices were
different. Therefore experimental economics, which focuses on price variations for a
small non-representative sample, and cross-national surveys, which focus on values and
socio-demographic variables for large samples, are clearly two complementary methods
that help us understand the main factors of the willingness to purchase GM food.
Micro-simulation, based on behavioural hypotheses confirmed by experimental
economics and applied to a representative sample of the population, may be a very
promising direction for future research.23
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